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Gateway-Schmateway: An Exchange
Between George Hermann and Alan Rau
George Bermann and Alan Scott Rau*
Jack Coe: It's my distinct honor to introduce both of the lead players in
the next program and to explain a little bit about the thinking behind it.
George Bermann is the Jean Monnet Professor of EU Law, the Walter
Gellhorn Professor of Law, and the Director of the Center for International
Commercial and Investment Arbitration at Columbia Law School. He is an
iconic figure in our field and much beloved by his students at Columbia.
Alan Rau is the Mark and Judy Yudof Chair in Law at the University of
Texas School of Law, known to many as one of the must-read scholars in
relation to American arbitration jurisprudence. Their resumes are long and
very, very impressive. I have known them both a long time, but in recent
years my interactions with them have arisen in connection with the
Restatement project. George, of course, is the Restatement's Chief
Reporter, and Alan has been one of the project's ALI-appointed Advisers
from the project's early days.
We thought it would be interesting today to give an impression of the
kinds of conversations to be heard at the by-invitation-only meetings we
hold to vet the drafts that we, the four ALI Reporters, prepare. It is the heart
of the ALI peer-review process. As many of you know, the time-honored
method is that the Reporters produce drafts with commentary and Reporters
Notes that support the positions put forth. Two bodies of peer commentators
(Advisers and Consultative Group Members) then critique the draft. In
Alan's case, that often involves a penetrating and very helpful memo,
detailing areas of agreement and his concerns.
In our regular physical meetings, we convene in a large meeting room
and, very soon after being called to order, conduct verbal exchanges that go

* This exchange is a transcript of a discussion held on April 17, 2015 at Pepperdine University
School of Law for the Pepperdine Law Review's symposium, titled "International Arbitration and
the Courts." The live recording can be accessed at http://livestream.com/pepperdinesol/
lawreviewsymposium.2015.
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beyond "Arbitration 101." And at the risk of perhaps excluding some
newcomers from the field (George and Alan are prone to get into the
advanced issues very quickly), we decided to hold an exchange-we
originally called it "a debate"---on selected issues that typify the kinds of
matters we have traversed during the ALI drafting and consultative process.
No doubt there will emerge both areas of agreement and of disagreement.
The written iterations we produce (drafts) are part of a synthesis of
ideas, and the process of hearing out Alan and others is very important to
that process and always influential. There inevitably are changes made by
the Reporters after these meetings to reflect the input of our many learned
colleagues from practice, academia, and the bench.
What I propose to do is to frame a topic and try to give enough
background so that you can come alongside. And then, let them discuss it
according to my interventions as moderator.
Using my discretion as moderator, I will also deputize Professor Chris
Drahozal, who is also an Associate Reporter on the Restatement. He has
standing to exert a measure of quality control over these proceedings and to
intervene as he sees best.
Additionally, as we are going to spill into certain subjects to be
examined in a later panel, notably the BG Group 1 case, I will also deputize
Andrea Bjorklund and Jarrod Wong, who have some deep interest and
understanding of this case and who will perhaps want to interject.
Of course, the expectation is that in addition to the free-for-all unfolding
on the dais, you will raise your hand, be recognized, and be heard with your
question and comment. With those ground rules before us, let me start with
the question, or a cluster of questions, that relate to competence-competence.
The relevant Restatement provision, section 2.8, states as follows:
"Unless the arbitration agreement provides otherwise, an arbitral tribunal
may rule on issues relating to its own jurisdiction, including, but not limited
to, the existence, validity, or scope of an international arbitration
agreement."
The first question relates to what this power in the tribunal means.
American jurisprudence differs from other systems as to the conclusiveness
of the arbitrator's jurisdictional determinations. The conversation is
complicated by some related questions. One is the extent to which the
arbitration agreement is to be treated as a contract separate from the main
1. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014).
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contract.
Our Supreme Court has relied on the agreement's legal
separateness as part of an approach that prevents courts from deciding the
validity of the main contract containing the arbitration agreement (an
agreement typically in clause form, but legally separate nonetheless).
Accordingly, it is often said that to prevent arbitration when the arbitration
clause is invoked before the court, attacks on validity (such as an
unconscionability defense) must be directed at the arbitration agreement
specifically. As a byproduct, because a court is not to keep the dispute from
the tribunal based merely on attacks on the validity of the main contract, the
main contract's validity will be for the tribunal to decide. In this connection,
Prima Paint is the paradigmatic case. 2
The second question that bears on the competence-competence
conversation is the extent to which the parties may affect by agreement the
arbitrators' and courts' respective presumptive roles with respect to
jurisdiction-related issues. Momentarily, I will invite George to address the
two concepts of "allocation" and "delegation" as we have come to use those
terms in Restatement parlance. Delegation is the ability of the parties by
agreement to rearrange the basic initial "allocation" of jurisdiction-related
issues. In other words, what issues related to jurisdiction can the parties
remove from the court's presumptive domain and give to the arbitrators for
conclusive decision?
An important sub-issue is how the parties must express their intention to
delegate. In other words, to be successful in giving issues otherwise
reserved for the court to the arbitral tribunal, how must the parties express
their intention? We'll see that the First Options3 case offers important
guidance in this regard, suggesting that the delegation must be "clear and
unmistakable." It is against this standard that courts evaluate, for example,
the effect of institutional rules that contain competence-competence
provisions.
So, George, can I get you and Alan to weigh in on just clarifying the
competence-competence?
George Bermann: Are you going to proceed through your subthemes or
should we take them all on at this point?

2. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406---07 (1967).
3. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
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Jack: Take them on, and I will return to them if I think they have not
been properly addressed.
George: What you described, Jack, was a fairly broad notion of
competence-competence. You included in it the validity of the arbitration
agreement and even its very existence. We in the United States are not
unusual in taking an extremely broad view of competence-competence. It is
not an overstatement to say that the arbitrators have competence to decide
just about any and every threshold issue, whether we call them issues of
jurisdiction or admissibility.
That does not mean, however, that no court will have intervened before
the arbitrators were empaneled to address those issues. In the general U.S.
law understanding, the competence of arbitrators to determine their own
competence is not exclusive; courts may at certain points address them if
asked to do so. The competence-competence of arbitrators could be
considered exclusive in that courts will simply not address them, at least
prior to the arbitration and issuance of the award. French law comes very
close to that idea.
In other words, there are certain threshold issues in arbitration that come
within the competence-competence of the arbitrators, but not exclusively so,
prior to constitution of the tribunal. And, as you implied Jack, there are
others that courts simply will not touch at all or, if they agree to do so, only
with the utmost of deference to the arbitrators.
We in this country are by no means alone in this view. We do not, in
this respect, practice the much-maligned "American exceptionalism."

Alan Rau: Well, I have a somewhat different take on this, but let me
say before we get into the substance that, when Jack first suggested the idea
of this panel to me, my first reaction was that George and I have discussed
these issues, on which we agree or disagree, so many times in our writings,
and in person at the Restatement meetings and other conferences, that it may
well be thought that there were nothing more to say.
And then it occurred to me that George might react the way Samuel
Johnson reacted when, at a meeting of his Literary Club, Oliver Goldsmith
proposed that they add fresh members because, Goldsmith said, since we've
had the same members for many years "there can be nothing new among us;
we have travelled over one another's minds."
And Johnson retorted, with some indignation, "Sir, you have not
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traveled over my mind, I promise you." And I think that George would
probably feel the same way and would say the same thing, so that we are not
going to be repeating ourselves, or at least it won't matter so much.
I would like to separate out-and I will try not to use sophisticated
foreign terms like competence-competence-I would like to separate out
two notions. One is timing: When does the decision take place? And the
other question is one of allocation: Who has the final decision-making
power? And the latter is the more interesting one.
If something is considered a ''jurisdictional" question, that is to say, if it
is thought to go to a party's consent to arbitrate, we usually assume that the
decision as to whether there is jurisdiction or not, the decision as to who
decides whether the arbitrators have jurisdiction, is taken by the court. But,
the possibility is open in American law, and almost uniquely in American
law, that this question can be allocated with finality to the arbitrators
themselves.
And that is where we get to the First Options case in which the court,
not for the first time but for the most important time, contemplated the
possibility that the parties might want to allocate that power to the arbitrators
themselves, that is, to entrust them with the final decision-making power
with respect to their own jurisdiction.
Now, perhaps we could talk about First Options. I was taught when I
was in law school that a case can only be understood in light of the precise
question that the court had in front of it. The question the court had in front
of it in First Options is: What to do about someone, Mr. Kaplan, who says
he never agreed to arbitrate anything at all and nevertheless has been roped
into the arbitration?
That is the core problem. Did I agree to arbitrate anything at all?
Outside of that core question, the whole problem of First Options, the whole
problem of the "clear and unmistakable," becomes far less important
because at some point the arbitrator is not an officious intermeddler; he is
not a stranger. He is someone that the parties have already consented to and
have hired. So, maybe we could talk about the allocation of the decisionmaking power outside of the area of core consent. Let me give a concrete
case because I think concrete cases are the most important.
Let's assume we have a contract that provides (this is an old chestnut)
for the arbitration of disputes arising out of the sale of "fruit." One party
wants to arbitrate a dispute about the shipment of tomatoes and the question
is whether this is governed by the arbitration clause-whether a tomato is a
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"fruit" for that purpose. I think it is botanically, but not in common usage.
All right, that is a jurisdictional question. That determines the
jurisdiction of the arbitrators to hear tomato-related disputes. I would
suggest-First Options or not-that it makes a lot of sense for that question
to be allocated to the arbitrators, and for us to presume that it should be
allocated to the arbitrators. I wonder what George feels about that case.
George: Oh, I'm glad to answer.
Chris Drahozal: Can I make one suggestion? Can you set out three
simple examples that everybody agrees on, as far as forgery of an arbitration
clause?
Alan: Now we're getting into the other question though.

[Laughter]
Chris: I'm sorry, that might be beyond that.
Jack: We'll come back to, in particular, severability and focus on the

main contract and defects in the main contract, but as we knew from the very
beginning, these are not easily compartmentalized and so the conversation
keeps spilling over into severability.
Chris: Okay.
Jack: But, your basic point, I think is a good one. It would be great to
come up with some common ground.
George: Okay. What Alan has done in his remarks is begin to unpack
consent. I assume Alan agrees with Mr. and Mrs. Kaplan when they said
that their consent was at stake and that a tribunal's jurisdiction over them in
the context of the dispute was very much in question. When insisting that
they were non-signatories and that there was no basis for piercing the veil
between them and their company, they were raising a jurisdictional
objection.
What Alan very respectably wants to do, I think, is to say: "Well, that
doesn't pertain, at least not equally, to questions of the scope of the

474

[Vol. 43: 469, 2016]

Gateway-Schmateway
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

agreement to arbitrate." And the usual rationale is that it is one thing to say,
"I never agreed to arbitrate," and it is another to say, "Well, I did agree to
arbitrate, but I didn't agree to arbitrate that."
As Alan views things, the latter question is exclusively, or at least
primarily, for the arbitrators. But I disagree.
The consent of the parties is as much at stake when the parties deny
agreeing to arbitrate a particular question as when they deny agreeing to
arbitrate at all. Therein lies, I think, the key difference between us.
Now we come to what we call in the Restatement the question of
delegation. A matter can be one that it is ordinarily appropriate for a court
to decide prior to arbitration but that the parties should be able to remove
from any judicial consideration at that stage.
The Restatement puts the question of scope of the agreement to arbitrate
that Alan posits-namely, whether a tomato is a fruit-in the category of
issues over which parties may fully delegate authority to the arbitrators. But
Alan wants the presumption to go the other way, that is, this question should
be presumptively for the arbitrators alone at the outset, so that there is no
room or need to speak of delegating authority over it to them.
But, of course, Mr. and Mrs. Kaplan's objection was not one of scope.
They said: "We never signed the damn thing at all." It is very hard to see
how they could possibly, under those circumstances, have delegated the
matter to the arbitrators. If the purported delegation is embedded in an
arbitration agreement that a party contests ever having subscribed to, I find it
very hard to treat that agreement as having effected a delegation of authority
to decide the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
Jack: So you would agree that in a post-dispute agreement about
whether or not I'm bound by this agreement, whether I'm even a party to it,
they could delegate in that manner, and that's what you refer to as extrinsic?
George: Yes, and we take that view, but only with respect to postdispute agreements.
Alan: Well, let's go back a bit. I don't think we have much problem,
much disagreement on the problem of Mr. Kaplan. But let's go back to the
question of tomatoes. "Consent" certainly is at issue. Another way of
saying it, 'jurisdiction" is at issue. But it's not reasonable, I think, to look at
this monolithically.
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If the parties have agreed to arbitrate something, the question then
becomes one of presumption, one of the choice of a proper default rule. Did
they, having agreed to arbitrate something, agree to arbitrate this dispute?
Now, how do you determine that? You don't determine it by labels, like
"clear and unmistakable," you ask: What would reasonable parties have
done? The interest of most contracting parties, I would think, is to minimize
cost. Costs are of two kinds. There are error costs: Who knows best? Who
is best capable of interpreting the agreement? Who has the comparative
advantage? Expertise in interpreting what the parties were likely to have
meant by "fruit"-those are error costs.
And then you have transaction costs. You want to ensure what the
English call "one-stop adjudication." We don't have to go to courts and to
arbitrators in various layers of adjudication. It's much more efficient and
reduces cost to do it all at the same time.
Both of those things cut in favor of a presumption that the fruit issue, the
tomato issue, should be assumed to be allocated to the arbitrators in the first
instance without the need of any delegation. Because that's probably the
majoritarian default rule. 4
And I was very interested in what Chris Drahozal was saying about the
Delaware statute earlier because it seems to me that what the Delaware
statute is saying, is giving us, is that same presumption about the
arbitrability of scope issues.
And I took Chris to say, "That's no big deal. It goes without saying; it's
what American courts have been doing." And I think that's right.
Chris Drahozal: You could do it that way. The parties could do it that
way.
Alan: Well it's the presumption of the statute, as I understand what you
were saying in terms of "substantive arbitrability."
Chris: Yes.

4. As one member of the Court suggested at the time of oral argument in First Options,
"Whenever you submit issues to arbitration, in effect you're consenting to a kind of rough-and-ready
disposition of whatever your claims or disputes may be, and therefore there's no reason to sort of
draw the fme lines as to what you were rough and ready about." Transcript of Oral Argument at
*43---44, First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) (No. 94-560).
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Alan: And it is a presumption that American courts have been applying.
And I think it's a sensible presumption in light of why we have
presumptions in the first place, which is to reduce probable costs, and it is,
therefore, in accord with the probable intention of the parties. And I have
not even mentioned the word "delegation" because I don't think you need it.
Jack: Okay, I think it would be useful for George to talk about the
derivation of the word "delegation" because people ask about it. And maybe
even talk about allocation because it shows up throughout the Restatement,
chapter two in particular.
George: Yes, I would be glad to do that, but I can't resist going back to
the scope question for a minute longer. What about the absurd scenario in
which you and I are landlord and tenant and have a lease with an arbitration
agreement? But we're also engaged in a completely different contractual
relationship----the sale of a used car, for example-evidenced by a contract
that does not have an arbitration clause in it at all.
Now, surely, you don't want, in a case in which the claim has absolutely
nothing to do with the lease (i.e., has only to do with the used car) for a court
to send us to arbitration. But that is where the logic of your position takes
us.
Alan: No. I think I disagree that I was saying that it is not consent-

based. I think it is consent-based, but it's a different kind of problem. It
raises a different kind of problem, and so we need to devise the appropriate
default rule for that problem.
You have given me a case where I think the default presumption is
probably rebutted. But in the fruit and tomato case, the default presumption
is that this must be for the arbitrators to decide because this has to be what
reasonable parties interested in reducing cost would want-that presumption
is very strong and not rebutted. 5
5. It strikes me that a more coherent and cogent answer might perhaps have run something like
this: To say that ''jurisdictional issues are presumptively allocated to the arbitrator when they require
interpretation of the agreement" is to say that deference is due only to real exercises in
interpretation. I would presume that an arbitral reading of "fruit" to encompass "tomatoes" would
fall within the original grant of power by contracting parties; an arbitral reading of "fruit" to
encompass ''heavy industrial machinery'' would probably not and so would begin to resemble an
excess of authority. As Judge Posner wrote, "[T]he grosser the apparent misinterpretation, the
likelier it is that the arbitrators weren't interpreting the contract at all." Hill v. Norfolk & Western
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George: Okay, let's move on.
Alan: Sure.
George: Jack asked about the concepts of allocation and delegation.
Now allocation is relatively easy because we have been discussing
presumptive allocation of authority throughout this discussion. And in our
universe, that is all that allocation means. It means that we have threshold
questions, and we have two potential decision makers over them. We want
some degree of clarity over the authority that arbitrators and courts,
respectively, have over those questions.
Now, in the Restatement, we began to wonder whether the parties are at
liberty to alter the presumptive allocation. To alter the allocation in the
direction of removing something from the arbitrators and reserving it to a
court is, I think, completely unproblematic. No one has to arbitrate anything
they did not agree to arbitrate. So reallocating in that direction never
worried us very much. The only thing that worried us about that was that
once you posit that something ordinarily for the arbitrators to decide is now
for courts to decide, you must furnish the courts a choice-of-law rule. The
moment we make something delegable back to a court, then we are dutybound as Restaters to guide the court as to what law they should apply,
whereas were the matter to remain with the arbitrators, we would have no
choice-of-law determination to make.
On the other hand, whether the parties can divest the authority of courts
to decide a threshold issue they presumptively have authority to decide is a
more difficult question. Even use of the term delegation in that direction
was thought to be problematic. Some Advisers thought the term improperly
implied a hierarchy in which courts occupy a higher place in the hierarchy
and arbitral tribunals are their inferiors.
Now, of course, that's not the intention at all. And we now try to make
that perfectly clear. If we were writing on a clean slate, and maybe we
should do so, I would prefer that we referred to "reallocation" rather than
"delegation." But, delegation is the term the Supreme Court has adopted.
Jack: Now, just for some of my students, a reminder of what we're
talking about here. We start off by positing that the tribunal has the

Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1195 (7th Cir. 1987). The same is so in the case posited by George.
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competence to determine its own competence-that is, to decide, for
example, if the parties indeed agreed to arbitrate the dispute placed before
the tribunal. And you said in your mind those are-virtually without
restriction-all jurisdictional issues.
George: Right.
Jack: That there is wide competence in the tribunal to decide such

issues does not, of course, mean that they have that prerogative to the
exclusion of courts. In fact, the competence is concurrent, and when a court
is invited to decide jurisdictional questions, subsidiary rules intervene to
indicate if it should, instead, let the arbitral tribunal be the first to consider
the issue. This is the question of "allocation." It is different from the
question of what deference a court should accord a tribunal's determinations
on jurisdiction-that is, when, later, the award is before the court.
Alan: No, but this can happen even before the award if someone asked

for an injunction against the arbitration on the grounds that the arbitrators
have no jurisdiction.
George: I mean, it can, but it will happen at the end.
Jack: So, whenever the arbitrators' decisions come before the court

(usually when the award comes before the court), there will be the separate
issue of the relative conclusiveness of the tribunal's rulings on jurisdiction.
But, at the moment, in connection with allocation and delegation, we are
focused on the stage at which the agreement to arbitrate is invoked before a
court.
George: It will certainly happen at the end. All the substantive
arbitrability questions may come up if they are still around at the award
stage.
But what we are focusing on here, and in the chapter that is coming
before the ALI annual meeting in May, is when the question of this arises at
the agreement enforcement stage.
Jack: So, now to the narrow application of what we've been calling

delegation.

Granted that the parties can delegate jurisdictional issues,
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whichever ones we agree upon, can they do that, or should they be assumed
to have done that, by virtue of naming in their arbitration clause institutional
rules that have a competence-competence provision?
We are referring to a provision that says the tribunal has the power to
determine its own jurisdiction, including issues relevant to the existence,
scope, and validity of the agreement. That may occur in combination with a
wide arbitration clause that provides that the tribunal shall decide "any and
all issues related to this contract" and that its award shall be "final."
Assuming the "clear and unmistakable" test governs the delegation question
of which we speak, should the above rules provisions, alone or in
combination, be deemed to have satisfied the test?
Does that suffice? Or, given what we just said about competencecompetence, is that ambiguous in that it could just convey that the tribunal
need not stop the proceeding to refer to a court to first decide jurisdictional
issues?
Alan: Can I just reframe that question?
Jack: Please.
Alan: I think the question is a fair question, but it's phrased perhaps a
little tendentiously. By the way, as I tried to say earlier, I think "clear and
unmistakable" is just "one overblown latke." 6 It really does not have much
to do with the scope problem.
But let me rephrase the question about the rules. As the Court in First
Options said, parties may, if they wish to, delegate jurisdictional issues to
arbitrators.
Immediately after that, the AAA amended its rules expressly for the
purpose of picking up on that possibility and giving to arbitrators the power
to decide with finality, as First Options contemplated, jurisdictional
questions.
There was no particular reason at that point to amend the rules to do
anything else, right? No one suggested that the arbitrators-when their
jurisdiction is challenged-have to pack up their papers, tum off the lights,
6. "'This is all one big overblown latke,' Rabbi Levi Shemtov said of the fuss over the White
House's Hanukkah party," which some criticized as having been "downsized" in comparison to its
predecessors. Rachel L. Swams, Washington Fuss Over White House Hanukkah Party, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2009, at A28.
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and go away-this was not a serious issue. The intent was obviously to pick
up on the hint that the Supreme Court gave in First Options.
So I would rephrase your question: given that legislative history, isn't it
clear that when people arbitrate under AAA rules, they intend to pick up on
that same assumption that the AAA drafters wanted to?
George: And that, of course, is not tendentious.
Alan: No, it's not tendentious in the slightest.

[Laughter]
Jack: No, well, and so you're adding to the consideration of whether
they actually achieved it, what they were attempting to do.
Alan: Yes, absolutely. George has made the point in one of his articles
that this wasn't perhaps the subjective intention of contracting parties. But
we never know what the subjective intentions of contracting parties are.
That's always inconclusive, but in construing contracts we look at the
backstory, we look at the legislative history, we look at what the draftsmen
were trying to do. We look at what most reasonable people would have
gotten, gleaned from the language.
Jack: But, if you look at the pre-Kaplan provisions that used to state the
competence-competence principle, they weren't much different from the
amended ones. And I know what they were trying to do, but for your
average party looking at a new iteration of the ICC or ICDR rules, they are
going to see yet another competence-competence provision, except perhaps
for its greater detail, making it more specific in its itemization of
jurisdiction-related issues than its predecessor.
Alan: Well I'm not sure, I would have to compare the language. But the

amendments were made, whatever they were, for the express purpose of
responding to the invitation of the Supreme Court. I don't think that's
questioned. 7

7. I now gather that the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules contained no reference at all to
competence-competence at the time the First Options decision was handed down in 1995; indeed,
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George: Well, I think the change was made to reflect the apparent
comfort of the Court with treating a plain vanilla competence-competence
clause as clear and unmistakable evidence of an intention to deprive courts
of authority over jurisdictional---even existence--questions at the outset.
By the way, Alan and I occasionally agree. But I nevertheless want to
say for the record that few people have Alan's combination of being both
contrarian and constructive. We need that in the Restatement, and it is a
function that Alan admirably performs.
Now, here is my concern. First of all, it does not really matter how
many times you place the term competence-competence in your agreement
or in your rules. In the prevailing U.S. view, competence-competence is
simply not exclusive.
My second concern is something I voiced at our last Restatement
meeting, and it too has impact. I agree with Alan that we should not "make
too much" of the requirement of clear and unmistakable evidence. But First
Options did establish a presumption that needs to be overcome. Yet every
institutional rule I know of has in it a competence-competence clause. And
the great majority of arbitration laws, at least modem ones, including the
UNCITRAL Model Law, also have a competence-competence clause in
them. One may well ask how many arbitrations are there going to be where
there isn't a competence-competence clause either in the rules or in the lex
arbitri. Arbitrations that take place in a place that has no competencecompetence clause in the lex arbitri and under rules containing a
competence-competence clause are few and far between.
Now, if that's the case, then we have done away with any semblance of
a requirement of the clear and unmistakable evidence test for delegating
jurisdictional matters to the arbitrators. The presumption simply is no longer
what it was; indeed, it is no longer. That troubles me a lot.
Finally, I do not agree with Alan that the intention behind amendment of
the AAA Rules has anything to do with any of this. I don't really care what
the drafters of the AAA Rules meant in this context. I care what the parties
even the version of the Rules effective July 1, 1996 contained no such provision. What is now Rule
7(a) appeared for the first time only in 1998 and was expressly "designed to address" Justice
Breyer's invitation in First Options. By contrast, the AAA's International Arbitration Rulesclosely modeled on the UNCITRAL Rules-had a provision as early as 1991 (Article 15.1) that
stated that ''the tribunal shall have the power to rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections
with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement." International Dispute
Resolution Procedures, AM. ARB. Ass'N 26 (June 1, 2009), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?
nodeld=/UCM/ADRSTG 002037.
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meant. I'm not prepared to impute the rule-drafters' intention to the parties.
To do so is, I think, misguided.
Alan: Well, how do you get at the intention of the parties given the fact
that the subjective intention of contracting parties will be unknowable by
definition? You have to make certain guesses.
I've always thought that when you interpret agreements you make
guesses based on the backstory, the legislative history, what happened to get
to that point, and what the people who drafted it had in mind has to be, at
least, a relevant piece of data. But, leaving that aside, if you don't agree
with that, how do you get at what the intention of the parties is?
George: Well, first of all, I object to the use of the word "legislator."
Alan: Sure, sure, sure. That's tendentious.
George: I love the AAA. I love the drafters of the AAA Rules, but they

are not yet legislators.
Jack: Aren't you on the AAA Council or the board?
George: I'm a AAA director, but I'm still not a legislator. I quite agree
with you, Alan, that the parties' intentions on the specific matter before us
are quite inscrutable. But, I nevertheless take First Options as my point of
departure.
If you were to take First Options away from me completely, I would
then be more in your universe.
Alan: Well, I would think it best to marginalize it precisely because of

the peculiar fact situation, which is not the one we're talking about, but after
First Options came the PacifiCare case. 8 Maybe we could just talk about

that, and then we can go onto something else.
That was a case where the contract between the parties said: ''No
punitive damages." The question is whether the arbitrators could award
RICO treble damages. That is to say, whether RICO treble damages were
included in the contractual ban on punitive damages. The Court said,
8. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003).
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without citing First Options, that's for the arbitrators to decide.
It seems to me that is very close to saying that the interpretation of the
contract, on the point of whether the arbitrators were authorized to award
RICO damages or not, is something that is presumptively given to the
arbitrators themselves. And that was done without any reference to First
Options. Isn't that the case we're talking about?
George: Well, I think it's fair to say that in PacifiCare, the premise was
that whether treble RICO damages were punitive was seriously arguable.
Alan: Sure.
George: I think that's fundamental there. But, if it were clear that treble
damages were punitive and punitive damages were categorically excluded
by the parties' agreement then the tribunal would lack authority to grant
them.
It would be for a court to determine whether, under those
circumstances, the RICO claim was arbitrable. But, maybe we're now
already into that very question; namely, whether the exclusion of punitive
damages is an authority question.
Alan: That's the move that I would make ifl were in your shoes.

[Laughter]
George: Okay.
Jack: Well, and in fact, I was initially next going to move to BG Group
for a short look, but now, let us jump that ...
George: Let's reverse that order.
Jack: ... [A]nd go to your question. Here's the question. We're
talking now about, and here's my hypothetical clause, in the contract it says:
"Consequential damages shall not be available under this contract." So the
award comes out, and the tribunal has given what appeared to be
consequential damages. Is that a matter of the merits, or does that fall within
the remedial jurisdiction?
Is it a question of remedial jurisdiction so that the court ought to look at
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it, not with deference and not view it as merits, which is not one of the bases
of vacatur, but as something more fundamental? And we dealt with it in a
Restatement, and George loses a lot of sleep over how we did so. But we
can't come up with anything better, so maybe you could speak to that.
George: But we had, what was it seven alternatives.
Audience Member: You had seven.
George: Okay, I added one.
Jack: George loves alternatives.
George: I move it from six to seven, but we already had six. And you

were responsible for that group----the six.
Audience Member: Not on my own.
George: [laughs] Okay. So here's the concern, and Jack has put it very
well. And it's a sad commentary that Alan and I spent half of yesterday's
cocktail party talking about this. But it's a fact.
Is a prohibition on the award of consequential damages an authority
question? Is part of the definition of the authority of the arbitrators the
remedies that they can grant? That is the fundamental question. And let me
just say for the sake of completeness that we have two U.S. cases that I am
aware of, both of which say in effect----one more plainly than the other-that
it's a merits rather than an authority question. So, the award cannot be
denied enforcement partially because to question whether consequential
damages may be granted amounts to second-guessing the arbitrators.
The other case-the Fertilizer Corp. ofIndia case9-is one in which the
tribunal again awarded consequential damages, but this time the tribunal
went to the trouble of explaining why it was awarding damages that the
parties had excluded.
Its reasoning was very interesting. The contract contained a choice-oflaw clause designating English law, and under the arbitrator's understanding
of English law, one loses the protection of an exclusion of consequential
9. Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Mgmt., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
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damages in the case of a fundamental breach.
Now, that arbitrator had a good deal going for him, at least in terms of
logic. He applied English law the way he understood it. And as he
understood it, English law rendered the consequential damages clause
unenforceable. And so he did exactly what he should have done.
So I am not of the view that the fact that an arbitrator awarded
consequential damages when they are categorically prohibited means that
the arbitrator exceeded his authority in awarding them. But it is not too
much, if we are to accept that result, to demand an explanation.
I would like to posit for discussion's sake the scenario in which the
consequential damages prohibition is found directly in the arbitration clause.
Now, if I'm not mistaken, Alan is of the view that that would change
nothing, and the availability of consequential damages is still not an
authority question.
Alan: That's right.
George: I have a very hard time seeing the availability of consequential
damages as anything but an authority question if the exclusion of
consequential damages is found in the arbitration clause itself and says
something along the lines of "the arbitrator shall decide any and all disputes
arising under or related to this contract but shall not award consequential
damages under any circumstance."
I have a very hard time treating this as a pure merits question. The
provisions of a contract are largely about the rights and obligations of the
parties.
But then there will be an arbitration clause and there might be a remedy
clause. Now, what distinguishes the arbitration and remedy clauses from all
the other clauses in the contract is that those clauses address the authoritythe power----ofthe arbitrators.
So I would not drive a sharp wedge as some would between the
question, on the one hand, of whether a tribunal has resolved a question not
put to it (clearly an authority question) and the question, on the other hand,
whether a tribunal used its authority in order to grant a remedy that the
contract said the tribunal could not award.
The question before us is a really interesting question; namely, whether
the scope of arbitral authority can depend only on what was arbitrated and
cannot depend on the use made of that authority.
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And I just want to add that in my travels, there is no provision of the
Restatement that comes in for as much criticism, indeed as much disbelief,
as the one understood to mean that when a tribunal grants a remedy that the
parties categorically excluded, it does not exceed its authority.
I think it's one thing to say, "I don't care what they said. I'm awarding
consequential damages anyway," and it's another thing to do what was done
in the Fertilizer case. In the latter, the tribunal stated a rationale for granting
a remedy that the parties appear to have excluded. I submit that the former
is an excess of authority, and the latter is not.
That proposal was met with a purely predictable response, which was: If
you allow an inquiry into whether the arbitrators reasoned before they
awarded consequential damages, you introduce the proverbial camel's nose
under the tent and usher in the end of arbitration.
Alan: Well, may I say that you get contracts that are drafted to say:
"Plaintiff shall not be awarded, and claimant shall not be entitled to, punitive
damages." Then you have contracts that say: "The arbitrator shall not award
punitive damages" or "The arbitrator has no authority to award punitive
damages."
Sometimes it's in article one of the contract, and sometimes it's in
article seventeen of the contract. I think it's totally fanciful to think that any
of this makes any difference to contracting parties who didn't have that-I
can't believe they would have that in mind-and they're not drawing these
fine distinctions in terms of intention.
I thought the Restatement's position is that it doesn't make any
difference whether it's in article one or seventeen or whether they say no
authority or no punitive damages-it is all assumed to be for the arbitrator.
The PacifiCare case I mentioned involved a number of different
contracts. Some of them said: "The arbitrator shall have no authority to
award punitive damages." Some of them said: "Punitive damages shall not
be awarded." The Supreme Court acted as if it made absolutely no
difference how the clause was phrased. It assumed that the availability of
such damages would in any event be for the arbitrator, and I think that's
absolutely right and gets us right back to the tomatoes case.
Given the fact that we're dealing with presumptions or default rules
anyway, the parties can always contract around it if they really want to limit
the authority of the arbitrator. So, it's a question of where you start. And I
can't believe that using language that nobody pays any attention to in the
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drafting stage should be interpreted as a limitation on the arbitral tribunal.
George: But that's not the premise of my position. My premise is
exactly yours. We drew a distinction between "do the arbitrators have the
authority to award consequential damages" and "does the contract allow
consequential damages." I think that distinction is as artificial as you do.
And my position does not tum on that distinction all. I don't much care
how the arbitration clause is phrased any more than you do. But I do reject
the premise that all we care about when it comes to excess of authority is
whether the arbitrators resolved a claim or issue not put before them,
disregarding whether they did something as arbitrators that the contract
forbade them to do.
Jack: Well, we're going to hear from Andrea Bjorklund, who was asked

to intervene, but we soften the presumption by saying what some might
consider weasel words. But I think it is in keeping with the best approach
we could come up with. This presumption can be rebutted, however.
Whether the presumption is rebutted depends on various factors bearing
on the parties' intent in formulating the provision, including whether the
provision clearly refers to the tribunal's authority rather than contractual
remedies; negotiating history of the provision; whether the provision is
located in the arbitration clause; the presence of the law of the arbitral
seat ...
Alan: Talk about the kitchen sink.
Jack: ... [O]frelevant limits on the tribunal's remedial powers; and the
tribunal's own recent assessment, or lack thereof-this was George's
point-concerning the parties' intent, including its characterization of the
limitation in question. There was no period in there anywhere. In other
words, that is rebuttable based on several considerations.
Andrea Bjorklund: I was just going to say that.
Jack: She is relinquished.
Andrea: No, I was just going to offer that, you know, that the U.S. and
the Canadian investment treaties limit the authority of arbitrators to the
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award of money damages, or in the case of expropriation, to restitution of
property. But in the alternative, the arbitrator has to give them a monetary
amount for the state to choose, which option that it would prefer. And that I
have always considered to be an authority question and that the arbitrators
just did not have the authority to go beyond that.
Most investment treaties don't specify. You have a default rule under
customary international law about what the arbitrators can do. Of course, in
practice, they mostly give money damages because that's what people want
and because there are enforcement problems if they try to go beyond that.
Jack: Well, that reminds me to apologize.

Chris Drahozal: Do you want to reiterate Andrea's comment because
she doesn't have a microphone?
Jack: Andrea said, and I will foreshorten it considerably, that ....

[Laughter]
Jack: No-only because I'm not gomg to remember all of the
eloquence, dear colleague.

Alan: I think you are making things worse, not better.
[Laughter]
Jack: Yeah, maybe I should just shoot myself and, you know.

[Laughter]
Jack: Isn't it time for lunch yet? Those treaties, BITs, some of this will
be the new model BIT for the United States, vintage 2012, I guess.

Andrea: NAFTA.
Jack: Oh, NAFTA has this? Ah. So, it has been in place for a while. It
limits, and she assumes it's an authority provision, the discretion of the
tribunal to grant, it says, "No punitive damages." And it says, "In principle,
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damages, but extraordinary restitution." Am I remembering correctly what
you said?
Andrea: Restitution in the event of expropriation.
Jack: Restitution in the event of expropriation. That is, you can get
your property back.
Andrea: With an alternative damage measure.
Jack: With an alternative damage measure. I'm sorry. I would have

taken notes if I knew Chris was going to catch me on it. And so, her point
was why is that not a limit on authority? She has always taken that to mean
authority. Meaning, if a tribunal granted punitive damages, it would be
exceeding its authority quite clearly.
She brought up investor-state arbitration. I'm apologizing for having
teased the BG Group case, but there is plenty of time after lunch to get into
it. And we will have some good commentators on it. I have time for one
more question before lunch.
Alan: Are we going to do the severability thing?
Jack: Well, it. ...
Alan: [laughs]
Jack: How many of you will give up fifteen minutes of lunch time to
hear about severability ?
Alan: Yeah, right.

[Laughter]
[crosstalk]
Jack: We touched on the point Alan would have made if I had given
him more time. I want to initiate a round of applause for what I think was
very stimulating, and as advertised, two heavyweights going at it. And I
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think we have some common ground and some that we will never agree on.
[Applause]
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***
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